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The Chinese Military and the "Taiwan Issue": 
How China Assesses Its Security Environment 
VINCENT WEI-CHENG wANG 
University of Richmond 
This article discusses China's assessment of its security environment by examining the 
role of the "Taiwan Issue" in China's military modernization and domestic politics. It 
sheds light on the strategic outlook of the world's largest yet most understudied armed 
forces: China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that the remilitarization of the 
"Taiwan Issue" since 1995-% has provided the PLA with impetus for acquiring more 
resources and influence. Although the PLA is a Pany army that exists to safeguard the 
interests of the Chinese Communist Pany, interviews and close studies of open-source 
material reveal interesting differences that result from evolving doctrinal developments, 
force structures, and broader political considerations. China is not only developing a 
military option vis-a-vis Taiwan but also building a modern fighting force befitting 
China's aspired "great power" status. The PLA's evolution will thus test China's "peace-
ful rise" slogan. 
The Might of a Rising Power 
China's leaders (the so-called Fourth GenerationY have recently advocated 
a new, more pragmatic and effective foreign policy.2 Dubbed "peaceful rise" 
(heping jueqi fDZfSij'jj~) or "peaceful development" (heping fazhan :fDZJS~~),3 
this strategy promotes China's growing "soft power," 4 winning China 
praises and defusing the "China threat" concerns. Epitomizing this state-
craft are China's active free trade agreement agenda with its Asian neigh-
bors and its pursuit of worldwide energy security. 
Yet China has also become more willing to flex its military muscles. In 
late 2006, China unveiled its biennial defense white paper, which continued 
to justify the double-digit increases in China's military expenditures.5 In 
January 2007, China unveiled its advanced homemade fighter, the Jian-10--
a cheaper alternative to advanced Western aircraft.6 On January 11, 2007, 
China shocked the world with its anti-satellite technology by destroying one 
of its aging weather satellites with a medium-range ballistic missile. After 
failing to confirm the event until almost two weeks later/ senior U.S. offi-
cials, including Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Robert 
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Gates, publicly voiced their concerns about China's rapid development of 
military power and lack of transparency.8 
Why did China cast away its carefully nurtured new image? Chinese of-
ficials sought to reassure the world that China remained committed to its 
fundamental objectives of pursuing "peaceful development" in a "harmoni-
ous world," notwithstanding these recent events, and that China's military 
modernization befits its rise as a world power.9 But soothing rhetoric is 
unlikely to quell speculation: Are these recent events isolated incidents or 
signals of a fundamental shift? Into what kind of "great power" will China 
grow? Only time will answer these questions. But in light of China's rapid 
economic growth, improved military capabilities, and opaque strategic in-
tentions, a study of how China views the country's security environment-
especially the "Taiwan issue," on which the Chinese military rationalizes 
its buildup-is critically important for not only the Asia- Pacific region but 
also the world. 
This article sheds light on the strategic outlook of a remarkably un-
derstudied armed forces that are also the world's largest: China's People's 
Liberation Army (PLA). With its sheer size, rapidly increasing capabilities, 
and uncertain intentions, the PLA is a vital pillar for a powerful China. 
Hence, the PLA's assessment of the country's external security environment, 
especially regarding the "Taiwan issue," entails profound implications. 
Challenges to Understanding China's Intentions 
Although important, the study of China's assessment of its external security 
environment is intellectually challenging. First, given its sheer size alone, 
China's military warrants scrutiny. With over 2.3 million members (down 
from 4.0 million in 1980), the PLA is the world's largest armed forces. Ac-
cording to some estimates, China's military spending is the world's second 
highest after that of the United States.1° China's sustained and rapid eco-
nomic growth, averaging 9 percent per annum for the last twen.ry-fi\'e years, 
provides the resource base for significant upgrades to its military capabili-
ties. Chinese government statistics confirm that, since 1990, China's official 
defense budget has seen double-digit increases every year, when adjusted 
for inflation. 
Second, the need to study the worldviews of China's military is accen-
tuated when one considers the difficulty of ascertaining the intentions of a 
government whose decision-making processes are shrouded in secrecy and 
whose leadership is neither subject to rule of law nor accountable to an elec-
torate. How the few individuals in China's high command view themselves 
and the outside world (in terms of threats and opportunities) portends 
enormous implications for regional and global security. 
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Despite the demonstrated need, efforts to study this powerful yet secre-
tive institution encounter two daunting methodological challenges. The 
first is access. As PLA expert David Shambaugh points out, the top officials 
of the PLA rarely grant interviews; and discussions with "think tanks" af-
filiated with the PLA tend to be highly formalistic. 11 The top generals' pub-
lic comments almost always echo or emphasize top Party leaders' state-
ments or well-known state policies. Although the PLA has issued many 
publications, surprisingly little about the Taiwan issue, or about how the 
PLA would fare against Taiwan's military, is written or available to the out-
sideY Scholars are unlikely to be able access internal Chinese publications, 
as sensitive information is strictly protected. 
The second challenge is disaggregation. How can we disentangle the 
PLA's world view from the world views of China's civilian leaders? Does the 
PLA have a "corporate" position that substantially-but not entirely-
overlaps with that of the Party? If so, does the PLA speak with one voice, 
much like what the unitary, rational actor would predict? Or, should we use 
the insight of bureaucratic politics-"what you see depends on where you 
stand"13-and ask if there are multiple voices within the PLA over tactics, 
if not over the general goal? This article seeks to make a modest contribu-
tion toward these questions and concerns. 
The PLA as Party-Anny vis-a-vis the Case of Taiwan 
Unlike professionalized national armed forces under civilian command (as 
in the West), the PLA is the protector and defender of China's party-state. 
Mao Zedong's (1893-1976) dictum, "political power grows out ofthe barrel 
of the gun" (qiang ganzi li chu zhengquan f~W.Y~I:Bil&;ffi), defined the criti-
cal role that the PLA has played in the politics of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rise to power and the 
founding of the PRC owed much to the PLA. Without the PLA's continued 
allegiance and support, the CCP's rule would be in jeopardy. 
This symbiotic relationship makes the study of the civil-military rela-
tionship in China inherently problematic. 14 Rather than existing as a na-
tional army, the PLA is a party-army; it safeguards the interests of the CCP. 
Since the PLA is a party-army, then, it cannot have a purely military view 
on the Taiwan issue. Indeed, the role of the PLA reflects its history with 
the CCP for the following reasons: 
• the CCP purports to represent the interests of the state and the people; 
• threats to the Party are considered threats to the state; 
• the military must be under the strict control of the Party; and 
• the military is the defender of the Party's legitimacy and enforcer of 
its claims. 
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The PRC Constitution and the CCP Constitution define China as a so-
cialist state, in which the CCP is a "vanguard." The 2004 white paper on 
defense reiterated that China's defense and military building must "main-
tain the fundamental principle and system of absolute Party leadership over 
the armed forces."15 It asserted that "it is the sacred responsibility of the 
Chinese armed forces to stop the 'Taiwan independence' forces from split-
ting the country" and warned that "should the Taiwan authorities ... make 
a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of 'Taiwan independ-
ence,' the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly 
crush it at any cost."16 Article 8 of the controversial Anti-Secession Law, 
passed March 14, 2005, mandates that China's State Council and Central 
Military Commission would decide on and execute "the non-peaceful 
means and other necessary measures" to protect China's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity in the event that "the 'Taiwan independence' secession-
ist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of 
Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's 
secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reuni-
fication should be completely exhausted."17 
Under its grand strategy for the first two decades of the twenty-first 
century--concentrating all energy in fully developing the country into a 
"well-off society" (xiaokang shelzui tN~w±~), China needs a peaceful inter-
national environment for its national development. 18 China aims to im-
prove its relationships with other great powers and to secure stability of its 
peripheries. The CCP seeks to shore up its tattered legitimacy, weakened by 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and perpetuate its raison d'etre by pro-
moting economic development and appropriating nationalism. Success in 
economic development helps transform nationalism; a potentially destabi-
lizing force for the Party, into a positive asset for the CCP. However, a 
showdown over Taiwan independence would jeopardize both objectives. 
Such adverse developments affect the PLA particularly, since it is the mili-
tary that must repel threats to the Party leaders while accomplishing their 
goals. The military's special role provides a point of departure for delineat-
ing the Party's and the military's worldviews and for differentiating the 
possible multiple voices on the Taiwan issue within the PLA. 
The Military as Cautious Hawk? 
Despite the agreement on national priorities and common interests be-
tween the CCP and the PLA, an interesting question remains: Are military 
leaders, for institutional reasons and because of the ways they have been 
socialized, more likely to adopt more "hawkish" foreign and security poli-
cies than civilian leaders? That is, would they be more militant and more 
likely to support quick, aggressive action? 
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According to the "military-industrial complex" school, the military 
stands as the beneficiary of a large budget, which they justify on the grounds 
of tense relationships with the outside world. This theory helps illuminate 
how the PLA uses the "Taiwan issue" to obtain more resources and influ-
ence in Chinese politics. In this regard, 1996 was a turning point for the Tai-
wan issue. From 1979, when the United States and the PRC established 
diplomatic relations, until 1996, the Taiwan issue had been managed diplo-
matically. The PRC replaced its unsuccessful "military liberation" ::tpproach 
with a policy of "peaceful reunification." The new policy was largely a 
placeholder: Despite its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, the PRC had nei-
ther the capability to enforce its claim nor any realistic military options. But . 
the policy allowed the PRC to relegate defense modernization as the last of 
Deng Xiaoping's (1904-97) Four Modernizations and, instead, to focus on 
economic development. China's military received low priority and became a 
bloated, insular, and obsolescent "people's army." China's military budgets 
were primarily consumed by the overstaffed ranks, rather than through the 
acquisition of modern weaponry, and spending increases were slow. The 
double-digit increases in China's military spending since 1990 should be 
viewed from the historical perspective of slower growth during the 1980s. 
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis remilitarized the Taiwan issue. Mter 
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui (b. 1923, presiding 1988-2000) visited his 
alma mater, Cornell University, in June 1995, and leading up to Taiwan's 
first direct popular presidential elections in March 1996, the PLA conducted 
war games and missile tests aimed at intimidating Taiwan. To defuse ten-
sion, President Bill Clinton dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to 
the region. Political scientist Andrew Nathan argued that China's actions 
indicated that it sought to protect its core security interests by preventing 
Taiwan from becoming the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of hostile forces in 
light of increasing Taiwanese independence, an emerging American con-
tainment policy, and possible Japanese rearmament. 19 Security expert Jona-
than Pollack argued that "the renewed military activism ... has provided a 
focal point and direction for Chinese military planning and defense acquisi-
tions that has been largely absent since the collapse of the Soviet Union."20 
Jiang Zemin (b. 1926) was reportedly criticized for being "too soft" on Tai-
wan by some military leaders. You Ji pointed out that "the PLA generals 
have gained by the flexing of military muscles in the Strait, through im-
proved Opportunities for higher budgetary allocations .... For the first time 
the PLA is able to act as a fairly independent pressure group."21 
The PLA's new gloomy assessment became a main rationale for its 
military modernization. As a result: . 
• budgetary outlays were substantially increased; 
• acquisition of advanced foreign weapons (especially from the former 
Soviet Union) became a priority; 
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• the PLA's military modernization became driven by the twin goals of 
deterring Taiwan's independence and dissuading international (U.S.) 
intervention by developing indigenous arms and purchasing foreign 
arms; and 
• the PLA's strategy became to focus on developing asymmetric war-
fare capabilities in certain "pockets of excellence" -e.g., ballistic mis-
siles, information operations/warfare, and other "assassin mace" (sha 
shou jian ~~~~) weapons. 
China's military modernization after 1996 seemed powerfully driven by the 
preparation for a Taiwan contingency . . 
However, an alternative perspective is more persuasive. The dominant 
(though contested) wisdom among international relations scholars is that 
military officers tend to be more cautious than their civilian counterparts 
about initiating the use of force. Sobered by the experience of combat, the 
theory holds, soldiers are hesitant to recommend military action except un-
der the most favorable circumstances.22 The Powell Doctrine, which asserts 
that when a nation is engaging in war, every resource and tool should be 
used to achieve overwhelming force against the enemy, is consistent with 
this view. 
Consequently, one would expect PLA leaders to be more cautious than 
civilian leaders in resorting to force. Andrew Scobell found that, in general, 
military leaders are less quick to resort to the use of force and that ground 
forces are more cautious.23 Alastair lain Johnston found that, during much 
of the Cold War era, although the PRC was more prone to dispute than any 
other major power except the United States and although it often resorted 
to higher level of violence, the escalations mostly involved territorial dis-
putes. Otherwise, the increase in China's relative power capabilities has not 
led to increased war-proneness in recent years, as China has gradually ac-
quired status and prestige.24 These and other scholars argue that, histori-
cally, China's use of force has been conservative. China tends to use force 
only as a supplement to a larger political strategy and usually when the cor-
relates are favorabie, notwithstanding its principled rhetoric. -The Chinese 
evidently took Sun Tzu's (544-496 B.C.E.) adage to heart : "The art of war is 
of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either 
to safety or to ruin."25 
China's show afforce in the 1995- 96 Taiwan Strait Crisis represented a 
form of "calculated belligerence." However, if "military conservatism" be-
comes excessive, it might cause unintended consequences. Scobell observed 
the danger of the Chinese military leaders' "cult of defense." A sense of 
insecurity was deeply rooted in history, due to China's "century of humil-
iation" and the PLA's history of fighting stronger enemies. This insecurity 
has led PLA leaders to develop a propensity to view the outside world in an 
excessively negative light and has led them to rationalize the use of force in 
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self-proclaimed defensive terms;26 Shambaugh noted that, objectively, Chi-
na's security environment is the best ever; yet the PLA still feels insecure, 
and its behavior reflects paranoia.27 
On one hand, these Chinese security elites acknowledge that the 
likelihood of invasion against China is virmally nil; the probabilities for 
large-scale armed conflicts to break out along China's borders (particularly 
away from the eastern seaboard) are low; and the great powers, for the time 
being, prefer cooperation (on North Korea, Iran, terrorism) to confronta-
tion. Yet, on the other hand, they see danger lurking in every bilateral 
relationship China has with other states, and they advocate for extra mar-
gins of security-undoubtedly a manifestation of the "cult of defense," 
which naturally tends to drag other states into a spiral that further accen-
tuates China's insecurity. . 
At the Shangri-la defense conference in Singapore in June 2005, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld offered a blunt assessment of the 
global implications of China's effort to build a state-of-the-art arsenal. He 
asked: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this grow-
ing investment" in missile forces?28 Although China has reiterated its in-
tentions of peace and development, its exceedingly pessimistic assessment 
of its security environment and its penchant for securing relative-gain ad-
vantages have triggered a regional arms race, typified by the "security 
dilemma" or "mirror image" theories in international relations. 
In short, owing to the PLA's unique responsibility in executing war, 
PLA leaders can be expected to be more cautious than their civilian counter-
parts regarding foreign and security policies. However, their excessive 
conservatism, which is a combined result of a "cult of security," a strategic 
culture of realism, 29 the insular background of the current officials}0 and the 
penchant to reject transparency as a strategic asset and to extol secrecy, has 
caused them to appear overly pessimistic. This perverse tendency entails de-
leterious implications for regional and global security. 
How the PLA Has Handled External Security Challenges over Time 
Studies of the PLA have recently witnessed a sea change. In the past, West-
ern analysts usually dismissed the PLA as "the world's largest military mu-
seum." But in recent years analysts have been surprised by therapid pro-
gress the Chinese military has made. The advanced fighters, anti-satellite 
weapons, and information warfare are only the most recent examples that 
reveal the protracted evolution of the PLA's doctrine and force structure 
since the early years of the "people's war." Four evolutionary stages in the 
relationship of PLA doctrinal development to force structure, identified in 
table 1, are as follows: People's War, People's War under Modern Condi-
tions, Local War, and Local War under High-Tech Conditions.31 
126 V. W. Wang 
TABLE 1 China's Evolving Military Doctrine 
Local War 
under 
Variable/ People's War Modern Revolution 
Date under Modern High-Tech in Military 
Range People's War Conditions Local War Conditions Affairs 
single-service joint HQ/ field units, smaller and selective Force fewer units; 
structure 
operations; operations; rapid reac-
more high pockets of fie ld armies group a rmies t ion units 
tech excellence? 
reduced to reduced to 
presumably 
Force size 4.0 million 4.0 million smaller than 3.0 million 2.5 million 2.5 million 
employ 
defend China deter Tai- information 
closer t o its win local wan from warfare by Main homeland borders and wars on independ- bypassing 
objective defense fight mobile China's ence; deter deficiencies 
style of war periphery U.S. from (electro-intervention magnetic 
dominance ) 
Main U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. regional Taiwan ft U.S.A. threat skirmishes U.S.A. 
Main budgetary budgetary budgetary doctrine-
limitation constraints constraints constraints capability t echnology gap 
modernization 
Main . in the after- changing changing Persian Gulf information 
catalyst math of the threat security War and end revolution Cultural perception posture of Cold War 
Revolution 
1978-85 lcprimary -~ prelimina ry -~~t.r:!!J!_I doctrine 
1985-88 residual ,-primar}tl p reliminary doctrine d . I doctrine 1 _ _2ct~~, 
residual ~- ·--, preliminary pre-nmary 1988-92 doctrine 1 do~trine I doctrine preliminary doctrine 
1992- residual 1 prima~l preliminary 
present doctrine ! .90~~~~~- doctrine 
SOURCES: Dennis J. Blasko, "PLA Force Structure: A 20-Year Retrospective," in Seeking Truth from Facts: A 
Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. 
Yang (Santa Manica, CA: RAND, 2001 ), 51-58; and Paul H. B. Godwin, "Compensating for Deficiencies: 
Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese People's Liberation Army: 1978- 1999," In Mulvenon and Yang, Seeking 
Truth [rom Facts, 110. 
People's War 
In the late 1970s, the PLA, over four million strong, was structured using 
the doctrine of "people's war" to defend the Chinese mainland from such 
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threats a& the Soviet Union. Having recently emerged from the turbulent 
Cultural Revolution, China's reformist leaders acknowledged the need for 
military modernization but assigned it last among the Four Modernizations. 
The low priority for military modernization led to low defense budgets, a 
situation that had been a key constraint on military modernization into the 
late 1990s. The PLA's force structure was dominated by the army and had a 
continental orientation. Its ground forces were organized around infantry 
corps (called field armies) which generally had three infantry divisions and 
smaller armor, engineer, artillery, and other combat service-support units. A 
large militia would complement main force and local force units as they 
"lured the enemy in deep." Air and naval forces primarily had a defensive 
mission and, for the most part, operated independently of the ground forces. 
People's War under Modem Conditions 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, PLA strategists began considering a 
doctrinal revision intended to defend China's borders and fight the Soviets 
in a more mobile style of war with a combined arms and joint force. The use 
of nuclear weapons was also envisaged. The new doctrine became known as 
"people's war under modern conditions." It called for a more flexible, pro-
fessional PLA, which increased the number of modern weapons in its inven-
tory. The emphasis on ground forces shifted more to tanks, self~propelled 
artillery, and armored personnel carriers. However, the cost of equipping 
enough of the force with sufficient modem weapons to fight the Soviets was 
prohibitive to the Chinese budget. Beginning in the 1980s, PLA infantry 
units began to be issued enough trucks to make them road mobile. 
Local War 
Between 1985 and 1988, the PLA personnel were reduced to three mil-
lion. These reductions permitted the integration of ground forces, naval 
forces, and air forces required to conduct modern warfare. In 1985, Deng 
Xiaoping reckoned that the threat of a major war was remote; instead, the 
more likely scenario would be a limited, local war on China's periphery. 
The formation of small, mobile, "First" or "Rapid Reaction Units" was a 
major organizational development peculiar to the "local war" doctrine. De-
spite these dramatic changes in the military, defense budgets remained 
tight until the end of the 1980s. 
The PLA suffered a blow to its prestige after its involvement in the 
June 4, 1989, Tiananmen massacre. One way to boost its prestige was to 
increase its budget and purchase new weapons. Meanwhile, the demise of 
the Soviet Union provided the Chinese government an opportunity to 
spend some of the new money it now was willing to devote to the military 
for the purchase of advanced military hardware that the West had denied 
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China since 1989. The implosion of the U.S.S.R. also forced the PLA to 
reexamine China's threats. 
Local War under Modern High-Technology Conditions & 
Revolution in Military Affairs 
The Gulf War (1990-91) forced a change in the attitudes of many PLA 
old guards, who had emphasized the role of diplomacy over weaponry. The 
war was an example of what the PLA theoreticians now call "local war under 
modern high-technology conditions" (LWUMHTC). By the mid-1990s, 
LWUMHTC had become the dominant doctrine in the PLA. At the same 
time, some PLA strategists expanded their study of other concepts of future 
high-technology warfare, including information warfare, which became 
known under the rubric of "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Between 
1997 and 2000, another half-million personnel were shed from the ranks. 
The major focus of PLA operational planning in the late 1990s had become 
preparation of military options and capabilities to ensure that Taiwan would 
not seek independence. The possibility that the U.S. military might become 
involved in the defense of Taiwan was a worst-case scenario that PLA plan-
ners also had to consider. Taiwan's location allows for the capabilities appli-
cable to scenarios for L WUMHTC to be applied to it. 
For the past two decades, multiple doctrinal concepts have existed or 
been in development concurrently within the PLA. Even though the size of 
the PLA and the manner in which its doctrine is expressed have changed 
over time, differing structures, missions, and doctrinal orientations exist 
concurrently within the PLA. Even today many ground force units are still 
best suited for people's war operations to defend the Chinese mainland. 
Others have been trained for a role in L WUMHTC. Certain units, such as 
missile and electronic warfare units, are also beginning to develop capabili-
ties suitable for twenty-first-century RMA warfare in addition to being 
integral to local war scenarios.32 Indeed, China's top military officials also 
seem quite interested in RMA. They anchor their force and doctrinal 
development in a broader politico-military context: Developing a modern 
professional military is indispensable to China's emergence as a preeminent 
global power that can rival the United States. Such imperatives clearly ne-
cessitate better understanding of this crucial force. 
Debunking the Monolithic Military 
Sovereignty & Territorial Integrity: Nationalism, Realism & Taiwan 
The methodological problems identified at the outset of this piece pre-
sent significant challenges for understanding the subtle yet important dif-
ferences within the PLA. The conventional wisdom- and the image the 
Chinese present to the outside world-is that the PLA is a monolithic en-
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tity, absolutely obeying the Party and unflinchingly protecting China's ter~ 
ritory and the Party's legitimacy. However, although little dissent is appar-
ent in official texts or interviews, when questions about specific corollaries 
or strategies arise, discernible differences within the PLA emerge. Research 
of open-source Chinese and English materials and interviews I conducted 
in Taiwan in July 2005 and in China in July 2006 reveal important similari-
ties and interesting differences regarding the PLA's broad assessments of 
the Taiwan situation. 
First, main PLA constituents share the view that the PLA's primary 
mission is to maintain China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this 
context, two strands of thinking converge on the Taiwan issue: nationalism 
and realism. The nationalist strand provides Chinese policies vis-a-vis Tai-
wan with moral justification and is the most frequently invoked answer. It 
views the Taiwan issue as a vestige of the "century of humiliation" China 
suffered at the hands ofthe imperialist powers in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, asserting that resolution of the Taiwan issue, regardless of 
what Taiwanese people may think, is an "internal affair" that calls for no 
outside intervention. 
Second, a corollary is that the Taiwan issue lies at the core of China's in-
terests and is a non-negotiable issue: If Taiwan were permitted to separate 
from China, the Party would lose the mandate to rule and the country would 
disintegrate, since Xinjiang, Tibet, and possibly Inner Mongolia would also 
seek to secede (despite the obvious differences between these areas-under 
direct PRC control-and Taiwan, which the PRC has never ruled). 
These principled stances belie at least two glaring exceptions. First, to 
maintain a peaceful external environment (including stability on its periph-
eries) and to allay international concerns about its economic and military 
ascent, China has assiduously improved its relations with many of the four-
teen countries that border it by forging "strategic partnerships" with them, 
establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and settling long-
standing boundary disputes. One analyst estimated that the total size of 
areas previously claimed by China that were formally ceded by these border 
delineation treaties was 340 times the size ofTaiwan.33 Pragmatism had pre-
vailed over principle. Second, rather than rejecting all foreign intervention, 
starting in 2003, China often asked the United States to help rein in Taiwan 
President Chen Shui-bian (b. 1950, presiding since 2000). In other words, 
outside intervention is fine, provided it advances Beijing's agenda. 
Geopolitics & the Position of Taiwan 
The examples above show that pragmatism can guide China's foreign 
and security policies, if circumstances dictate. Nonetheless, nationalism 
provides China with a moralistic cover for China's real interest in Taiwan. 
It offers a raison d'etre for the Party and the army, and it also fortifies the 
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"defensive" nature of the PLA's actions. But the more convincing reason 
for China's intense interest in Taiwan-and one that is less openly dis-
cussed-is geopolitics. For the past four centuries, the main threats to 
China's security have come from China's Eastern seaboard. Many contem-
porary Chinese analysts conclude that the United States is the main threat 
to China. Control of Taiwan not only eliminates the possibility of Taiwan 
being used as an instrument to subvert China by hostile forces but also pro-
vides China with an indispensable strategic springboard for projecting its 
power into the Western Pacific region. 
To become a preeminent regional or global power, China must develop 
power-projection capabilities, such as a blue-water navy. Taiwan occupies a 
crucial link for China's geopolitical ambitions.34 The Pentagon's 2006 PLA 
report concluded that the objectives of the PRC's military modernization 
had moved beyond the Taiwan issue; its progress had surprised U.S. de-
fense officials; and its success had altered the regional balance of power. 35 
The defensive argument based on nationalism thus provides a moralistic 
pretext for a masked, potentially offensive rationale based on geopolitics. 
Second, China's approach toward Taiwan exemplifies its new grand 
strategy, which Lin Chong-pin, a former deputy defense minister of Taiwan, 
characterizes as "dominating the region without fighting." Through a com-
bined strategy of diplomatic isolation, political division, economic integra-
tion, and military coercion, Beijing seeks not to destroy Taiwan but to take 
Taiwan intact. As Lin points out, Beijing is determined to acquire credible 
military capabilities as: (1) deterrents against U.S. intervention in the Tai-
wan · Strait; (2) coercive instruments against Taiwanese independence; and 
(3) crucial tools for seizing Taiwan largely unharmed, if extra-military ap-
proaches to achieve unification fail.36 As part of the dialectic thinking preva-
lent among Chinese strategists, Beijing prefers not to resort to these military 
options in battles but rather to shore up the credibility of its threat of non-
peaceful means. This approach reflects a long tradition in Chinese strategic 
thinking inspired by Sun Tzu's Art of War: "The highest form of general-
ship is to attack the enemy's plans. The next best is to prevent the function 
of enemies' forces. The next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the 
field. And the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.'137 
On Taiwan & Unification 
Peaceful unification is thus preferable to forceful unification. But, in 
dialectic reasoning, preparation for the latter makes the former more credi-
ble. In a systematic cataloguing effort, PLA Colonel Wang Weixing pub-
lished an article in 2004 that summarized the CCP's five-decade policy of 
peaceful unification toward Taiwan, covering such issues as the method for 
unification, Taiwan's status, government agencies, and external relations.38 
Wang's impressive list clearly illustrated, prima facie, China's preference or 
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even eagerness for resolving the Taiwan issue through peaceful unification. 
His article enumerated the "generous" benefits for Taiwan after unification 
but defended the refusal to renounce the use of force: "A thorough study of 
history will show that any country>s task of unification is almost always 
accomplished through war," according to his reading of world history.39 
Although both China>s civilian and military leaders prefer incorporat-
ing Taiwan peacefully and retaining Taiwan's physical and human re-
sources, notable differences on how to achieve the unshakable goal of 
unification exist, if the strategy of peaceful unification should fail. Chinese 
military writings are almost uniformly negative in their assessments of Tai-
wan>s political evolution. Prevalent are frustration that past policies toward 
Taiwan have not succeeded, fear that Chen Shui-bian or others will acceler-
ate steps toward Taiwan's de jure independence, and a sense of urgency that 
the PLA must accelerate the fimil preparation for a military showdown. 
General Zhang Wannian, China's most powerful general during the Jiang 
era (1989-2002), betrayed his frustration with the central government's 
handling of the cross-strait impasse when he warned in 2000 that war was 
certain to break out in the Taiwan Strait in the next five years. In 1999, he 
led more than five hundred Chinese generals who signed a petition calling 
for tougher action against Taiwan after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's 
controversial description of cross-strait ties as "special state-to-state rela-
tions."40 In the Chinese context, Zhang's bravado was unusual. 
Curiously, more Chinese analysts believe that time is on the Chinese 
side. Professor Shen Dingli of Fudan University exemplifies this confi-
dence. He argued that the threat posed to the PRC by the Taiwan inde-
pendence movement will diminish as China progressively strengthens its 
military capabilities.4L His optimism contrasts with other pessimistic and 
alarmist evaluations of political trends in Taiwan. 
Taiwan & the Use of Force 
Although most Chinese writers maintain that the PLA will have no 
choice but to use force against Taiwan to squelch its attempts at independ-
ence (and few analysts outside China question that premise), Chinese discus-
sions reveal important divergences on key issues concerning the forceful 
option. The divergences have arisen partly as a result of the coexistence of 
several schools in the doctrinal development of China's military. 
The first question focuses on certainty. The "people's war" school cares 
more about objectives and determination than about the political conse-
quences of using force. Confidence has been derived from the myth that the 
PLA has always fought and prevailed over stronger enemies through asym-
metric war, exemplified by Mao's dictum, "You fight your way, [and] I fight 
my way" (ni da ni de, wo da wo de {)j\flf%!\li9 , tl(;tJ~Ii9).42 Differences in in-
tensities and approaches ensure that the PLA will eventually prevail. The 
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willingness for the PRC to suffer the associated costs is simply asserted, 
rather than analyzed. It is unclear whether those who believe that China is 
willing to sacrifice its economic development for a war over Taiwan truly 
understand the magnitude of that scenario. 
In contrast, the "revolution in military affairs" school is likely to be more 
cautious. Adherents of RMA understand that military modernization cannot 
be achieved through great leaps forward. Success in battle requires mechani-
zation and communication. Success also requires "active defense"-the abil-
ity to sustain an initial strike and survive. Interestingly, even this school 
(exemplified by the Second Artillery, China's strategic missile force) actively 
seeks opportunities to wage asymmetric warfare in order to close the technol-
ogy gap. Here, open-source discussions tend to focus more on the utility of 
offense for the weaker party and less on China's own vulnerabilities. 43 
Preparedness for & the Potential Results of War 
Although virtually all Chinese military writings acknowledge that one 
huge obstacle to the PLA's military options would be possible U.S. inter-
vention, important internal debates exist within the PLA on the broader 
issue of preparedness. Some within the PLA admit that, given the stringent 
requirements of "annexing Taiwan without fighting" and "deterring the 
United States," the PLA is not yet ready, despite the considerable progress 
it has made in recent years toward possessing "credible options" to in-
timidate or actually attack Taiwan. 
Still, although many Chinese military · writings have reached the 
gloomy conclusion that there will inevitably be a war over Taiwan, mimy 
issues remain unresolved: what follows the initial onslaught, what consti-
tutes the end state, and-more fundamentally-what constitutes "victory." 
Missile strikes aimed at decapitating Taiwan's leadership and command 
and control centers may cause initial damage; but they alone will not cause 
the Taiwanese to capitulate. A bloody conquest is politically infeasible, as 
resistance from the Taiwanese will make the island ungovernable. For an 
army whose reputation was tarnished in- the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, 
the PLA remains concerned about any detrimental long-term political fall-
out for its military actions.44 
Beijing could take several courses of action against Taiwan, including 
persuasion and coercion or limited-force options-such as employing in-
formation operations, special operation forces, and short-range ballistic 
missiles or air strikes on key military or political sites in Taiwan-to try to 
break the will of Taiwan's leadership and population. Beijing could also 
consider air and missile campaigns, a blockade, or an amphibious inva-
sion.45 The lower-intensity actions are most feasible from the standpoint of 
military preparedness; however, they are also the least likely to defeat Tai-
wan. The higher-intensity actions are more likely to cause Taiwan to ca-
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pitulate; however, they are also the least feasible options from the stand-
points of military preparation and international politics. These escalatory 
actions largely correspond inversely with Sun Tzu's best, second best, third 
best, and worst military strategies. In short, unless Taiwan is willing to 
come to terms with Beijing, China does not currently appear to have feasi-
ble military options for solving the "Taiwan issue." 
The PLA & the Taiwan Issue in the Post-Anti-Secession Law Era 
Because of its lack of good options for dealing with Taiwan, China will real-
istically view the peaceful absorption of Taiwan as a long-term goal, focusing 
its short-run emphasis on preventing Taiwan's de jure independence. The 
nine-word adage given by Hu Jintao in September 2004, "zhengqu tan, zhun-
bei da, bupa tuo" ~mz~ , ~fJJH, /f'['B:J:ffi. (strive for negotiations, prepare for 
war, (and] not fear delays), sums up China's current strategic approach vis-a-
vis Taiwan. The adage still serves as the PLA's wisest course of action. 
According to one analyst, "striving for negotiations" means that the Hu 
leadership will reach out to the people of Taiwan and continue creating all 
possibilities for peaceful negotiations between the two sides. "Preparing for 
war" means completing all preparations for a military struggle. If war is 
unavoidable, the PLA should safeguard the nation's sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity at all cost. "Not fearing delays" means that, under the pre-
condition that Taiwan does not split from China, China seeks to cultivate a 
twenty-year peaceful development environment and to maintain the cross-
strait status quo.46 
Meanwhile, the PLA will continue mixing the strategies of concealing 
weaknesses (cangxu ~Nit) and concealing strengths (cangshi Ji\:jf) to maxi-
mize its strategic advantage vis-a-vis Taiwan and the United States by creat-
ing deception and sowing confusion. Resembling the "empty fortress strat-
egy'' (kongcheng ji ~~if!-) of the ThirtY-Six Strategies, a collection of classic 
proverbs related to military strategy and tactics, concealing weaknesses in-
duces the enemy to overestimate one's capabilities and thus achieves deter-
rence through deception. Concealing strengths tempts the enemy to under-
estimate one's capabilities and thus achieves compellence through surprise. 
Cross-strait relations entered a new era with the passage of the Anti-
Secession Law (ASL) in March 2005. However, the law did not alter the 
strategic fundamentals. In one sense, the ASL put additional pressure on the 
PLA to accelerate its military preparedness for dealing with the conditions, 
enumerated in Article 8, which call for "non-peaceful means." On the other 
hand, by more clearly hinting at Beijing's "red lines," the ASL may slow 
down the momentum of Taiwan's independence movement and thus help 
relieve the pressure on the PLA. The Party and the military thus share 
common interests in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
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One remaining question is the impact of the PLA's professionalizatioiJ 
on the Taiwan issue. Will professionalization cause the PLA gradually tc 
differentiate its purely military goals from those of the Party? Will a profes· 
sionalized PLA be more likely to see the Taiwan issue strictly from a mill· 
tary angle and thus become more or less hawkish? Nobody knows. But 
despite all the well~recognized problems in studying it, the PLA is too im· 
portant to be relegated to the realm of the educated guess. 
Many have justifiably criticized that military-to-military engagement~ 
with the PRC have brought few positive results. The alternative would be an 
insular, secretive, and powerful military that is not subject to effective civil· 
ian control and that takes actions based on "cult-of-defense" or worst-case 
scenarios. Limited evidence indicates, however, that China's military is ca-
pable of learning and making adjustments. In this sense, changes in how the 
Chinese military views and deals with the country's security environment 
will be a litmus test for China's stated national objective of"peaceful rise." 
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